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Abstract 
It is submitted in this article that assisting/encouraging is normatively different from and less harmful and 
dangerous than perpetration, and that the unfairness and injustice of complicity is doubled in the context of 
extended joint criminal enterprise. The defendant’s participation in the underlying crime is constructed as 
participation in the collateral crime and such fictitiously constructed participation is further constructed as 
actus reus of the collateral crime; and the defendant’s foresight of the collateral crime is constructed as 
intention to assist/encourage the collateral crime and such fictitiously constructed mental state is further 
constructed as sufficient mens rea for the collateral crime. The double constructive nature of this doctrine 
cries out for legal reform, especially in jurisdictions where it is still retained as a sui generis doctrine. It is 
proposed that a new lesser offence of risking another’s collateral offending will serve better the purpose of 
fair labelling and proportionate punishment.  
Key Words: Extended joint criminal enterprise; constructive liability; change of normative position; fair 
labelling; proportionate punishment; risk-taking 
Introduction 
 
The common law doctrine that a person could be liable for a collateral crime B committed by 
his or her confederate if he or she shared a common purpose with that person to do crime A 
foreseeing that crime B might be committed in the course of doing crime A is under intensive 
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debate in recent years. This doctrine is termed as ‘joint enterprise complicity’1 or ‘parasitic 
accessorial liability’2 in England and Wales and ‘extended joint criminal enterprise’ in 
Australia3 and Hong Kong.4  Under this doctrine there is no need to prove that D had 
provided actual assistance or encouragement to the commission of the collateral crime by P. 
It was held that D’s liability for the collateral crime hinged on his or her participation in the 
underlying crime with a foresight that the collateral crime might be committed by P in the 
course of doing the underlying crime. 5 Such a doctrine could be said to have gained its life 
after Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen —a 1985 decision of the Privy Council.6  This case was 
then followed by R v Powell and English7 in England and Wales as a leading case for joint 
enterprise complicity, which had been applied thereafter until it has been abolished by the 
recent case of R v Jogee.8 Now, it is the law in England and Wales that for an accessory to be 
liable for the offences committed by the perpetrator it has to be proved that the accessory has 
actually assisted or encouraged the perpetrator intending to assist/encourage the perpetrator to 
commit the target crime; and foresight that P might commit the crime is not sufficient to 
make D liable for that crime.9 This reinterpretation of the law of complicity receives 
support10 as well as challenges.11   
																																																								
1 R v ABCD [2011] QB 841; R v Rahman [2008] 3 WLR 264;  Beatrice Krebs, "Joint Criminal Enterprise" (2010) 73(4) 
Modern Law Review 578, 592; A. P. Simester,“The Mental Element in Complicity” (2006) 122 (4) Law Quarterly Review 
578, 585-586; House of Commons, Justice Committee, Joint Enterprise, Eleventh Report of Session 2010–12, 16, Jeremy 
Horder’s response to (Q108).  
2 R. v Gnango [2012]1 AC 827; J. C. Smith, “Criminal Liability of Accessories: Law and Law Reform” (1997) 113 Law 
Quarterly Review 453, 465.  
3 McAuliffe v The Queen [1995] 183 CLR 108; Clayton v The Queen [2006] 168 A Crim R 174.  
4 Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen [1985] AC 168; Sze Kwan-Lung v HKSAR [2004] 7 HKAFCR 475. 
5 R v Powell and English [1999]1 AC 1, at 2; R v ABCD [2011] QB 845, 849.  
6 [1985] AC 168. 
7 [1999]1 AC 1. 
8 [2016] UKSC 8. 
9 R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8 at [9].  
10 Matthew Dyson, “Shorn-off complicity” (2016) 75 (2) Cambridge Law Journal 196, 199; D. J. Baker, “Lesser Included 
Offences, Alternative Offences and Accessorial Liability” (2016) 80 (6) Journal of Criminal Law 446, 449.  
	 3 
 
The High Court of Australia in its recently decided case Miller v The Queen12 rejected to 
follow R v Jogee holding that all parties to a joint criminal enterprise should be liable for any 
collateral crime committed by a co-venturer that is within the scope of their agreement and 
that an incidental crime contemplated by the parties is within the scope of the agreement.13 
The most recent Hong Kong case involving joint enterprise complicity is HKSAR v Chan 
Kam-Shing,14 which reiterated that joint enterprise complicity is distinct from standard 
complicity of assisting/encouraging,15 and that Chan Wing-Siu should be followed in Hong 
Kong. The law governs joint enterprise complicity is no longer common.16 The divergence 
among these three influential cases is whether Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen has set the correct 
mens rea element to make a participant in a joint criminal enterprise liable for any collateral 
crime committed. Likewise, many scholarly works have focused on the mens rea part of 
complicity liability providing us very illuminating ideas about whether the law is well 
principled.17 However, this paper will provide a different perspective looking into the double 
constructive nature of extended joint criminal enterprise liability, which will cover both the 
actus reus and mens rea aspects.         
																																																																																																																																																																												
11 A. P. Simester, “Accessory Liability and Common Unlawful Purposes” (2017) 133 Law Quarterly Review 73, 86; D. J. 
Baker, “Jogee: Jury Directions and the Manslaughter Alternative” (2017) 1 Criminal Law Review 51, 54; David Ormerod 
and Karl Laird, “Jogee: Not the End of a Legal Saga but the Start of One?”(2016) 8 Criminal Law Review 539, 543; Findlay 
Stark, “The Demise of ‘Parasitic Accessorial Liability’: Substantive Judicial Reform, not Common Law Housekeeping” 
(2016) 75 (3) Cambridge Law Journal 550, 578-579. 
12 [2016] HCA 30. 
13 Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30 at [4].  
14 [2016] HKEC 2715.  
15 HKSAR v Chan Kam-Shing [2016] HKEC 2715 at [33]-[40].  
16 Simester, n. 11 above, 73.  
17 Simester, n.11 above; Dyson, n. 10 above; Baker, n. 11 above; Graham Virgo, "Joint Enterprise Liability is Dead: Long 
Live Accessorial Liability" (2012) 11 Crimal Law Review 850; G. R. Sullivan, “Doing Without Complicity” (2012) Journal 
of Commonwealth Criminal Law 199; William Wilson and David Ormerod, "Simply Harsh to Fairly Simple: Joint Enterprise 
Reform" (2015) 1 Criminal Law Review 3; Simester, n.1 above; Joshua Dressler, "Reassessing the Theoretical 
Underpinnings of Accomplice Liability: New Solutions to an Old Problem" (1985) 37(1) The Hastings Law Journal 91.   
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The Common Law Doctrine of Extended Joint Criminal Enterprise 	
The term “joint enterprise” can be used to refer to “three related but not identical situations”18 
where two or more people agree to commit an offence or share with each other an intention to 
commit an offence. The first situation refers to the case where all participants act in concert 
as co-perpetrators to commit a single crime and the crime is subsequently committed. This is 
a straightforward case of perpetration and it has nothing to do with complicity. The second 
situation involves the case where D and P have a common purpose to commit a single crime 
with D being the assister/encourager and P being the perpetrator and the crime is 
subsequently committed by P. This is a standard case of complicity, and P will be liable for 
the crime as a perpetrator while D will be liable for the crime as an accessory.  The third 
situation is the one that attracts special attention from scholars and commentators.19 It covers 
the case where two persons act in concert to commit a crime A, over which they all share a 
common purpose, and in the course of it one of them has committed crime B which the other 
person has foreseen as a possible incident. The first two situations could be deemed as 
standard case of joint enterprise, or "plain vanilla" joint enterprise according to Professor 
Simester.20 The third situation is the target of this paper, i.e. extended joint criminal 
enterprise.  
          
																																																								
18 R v ABCD [2011] QB 841, 845.  
19 Simester, n.1 above, 592; A. P. Simester et al, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 5th ed, 
2013) 245; See D. J. Baker, Foresight in Common Purpose Complicity/Joint Enterprise Complicity: It Is a Maxim of 
Evidence, Not a Substantive Fault Element (Draft Chapter(2013/14): Reinterpreting Criminal Complicity, forthcoming) 
(October 10, 2012) Social Science Research Network <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2507529>, at 38, accessed on 10 October, 
2012. 
20 Simester, n. 11 above, 76.  
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The rule regarding joint enterprise cases in English criminal law can be traced at least as far 
back as Lord Dacre’s case, 21where Lord Dacre and some others agreed to steal deer in a 
park with one of the participants in the theft of the deer killing a gamekeeper. Lord Dacre 
was on the other side of the park but they were all held liable for murder,22 because they were 
acting in concert and were impliedly encouraging each other to use whatever force was 
necessary to avoid arrest. It can be said that the collateral crime is authorised impliedly by 
those participants in the enterprise and therefore it was a plain vanilla case of joint enterprise.  
Sir Matthew Hale wrote that if several persons come to commit an unlawful act and were 
present at the time of the act, they will all be liable for that crime though only one of them did 
it. 23 The same dictum was adopted by Sir Michael Foster in his Crown Cases:24  
 
So that if several persons set out together, or in small parties, upon one common design, be it 
murder or other felony, or for any other purpose unlawful in itself, … they are all, provided the 
fact be committed, in the eye of the law [equally liable]; … for it was made a common cause with 
them, each man operated his station at one and the same instant, towards the same common end, 
and the part each man took tended to give countenance, encouragement, and protection to the 
whole gang, and to insure the success of their common enterprise. 
 
The standard case of joint enterprise faces few challenges because it goes through the route 
either of co-perpetration or standard complicity of assisting or encouraging. If all participants 
have committed the actus reus of the crime with required mens rea then they should all be 
liable for the crime as perpetrators. If only one of them has committed the crime, the rest of 
them have given encouragement by agreeing that the crime should be committed and 
therefore should be liable as accessories.  It is a logical conclusion by applying the "plain 																																																								
21 Lord Dacre's Case (1535) 72 Eng Rep 458 (KB). 
22 Matthew Hale, The History of the Pleas of the Crown Vol. 1 (London: Professional Books, 1678) 215.  
23 Ibid, 443-444. 
24 Michael Foster, Crown Cases (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1776) 354.  
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vanilla" joint enterprise that if participants only had a common purpose to steal, and the 
collateral crime of one of them was merely the result of the situation in which he found 
himself, without any previous agreement, then the rest should not be liable for this collateral 
offence. 25  
 
The key question is what is included in the common purpose.  If D and P have a common 
purpose to do crime A and in the course of it P has committed crime B, under what 
circumstances can it be said that crime B is included in the common purpose as well? In the 
19th century case of R v Cramp, it was held that ‘a person is an accomplice in the crime 
charged if he took part in its commission, and was privy to the criminal intent of the thing 
done.’26 According to such reasoning, a person who participated in a joint enterprise of doing 
crime A knowing or contemplating the incidental crime B, will be deemed as providing 
encouragement not only for crime A but also for crime B. Subsequent cases used terms such 
as “within the scope of the joint enterprise”27 and “within the ambit of the common 
agreement”28 to decide whether D should be liable for P’s collateral offence in the course of 
executing the underlying crime of their joint enterprise. 29  At this stage terms like 
“contemplation” and “foresight” started to emerge in judgments. In Davies v DPP, it was 
held:30 
 
																																																								
25 R v Collison (1831) 4 Car & P 565, 828.  
26 R v Cramp (1880) 14 Cox CC 390, 393.  
27 R v Radalyski (1899)24 VLR 687; R v Murray [1924] VLR 374; R v Surridge [1942] 42 SR (NSW) 278; R v Smith [1963] 
1 WLR 1200; R v Vandine [1970] 1 NSWR 252; Johns v The Queen [1980] 143 CLR 108; R v Lovesey [1970]1 QB 352.  
28 R v Anderson and Morris [1966] 2 QB 110; R v McClafferty [1980] 11 NIJB; R v Dunbar [1988] Crim LR 693.   
29 See Sir Roger Tulson, "Sir Michael Foster, Professor Williams and Complicity in Murder" in Dennis J. Baker and Jeremy 
Horder (eds), The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law--The Legacy of Glanville Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013) 230, 236.  
30 Davies v DPP [1954] AC 378, 401, per Lord Simonds and Lord Chancellor.  
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In particular, I can see no reason why, if half a dozen boys fight another crowd, and one of them 
produces a knife and stabs one of the opponents to death, all the rest of his group should be 
treated as accomplices in the use of a knife and the infliction of mortal injury by that means, 
unless there is evidence that the rest intended or concerted or at least contemplated an attack with 
a knife by one of their number, as opposed to a common assault.” [My emphasis] 
  
The Court in this judgment made contemplation an alternative to intention. The law tended to 
divert from the route of common purpose to another route of foresight. At first, it seems to 
require that any collateral crime committed has to be within the common purpose, which 
means there is a tacit agreement or conditional common intention among participants over the 
collateral crime.  And gradually it was asserted that a collateral crime falls within the 
common purpose if it is within the contemplation of participants or if it is foreseen as a 
possible incident of the execution of their joint criminal enterprise.31 The fact that D has 
foreseen or contemplated the collateral crime works as evidence from which a jury can 
conclude that the collateral crime is within the common purpose. Finally, foresight was made 
a sufficient fault element to make participants fully liable as perpetrators for the collateral 
crime in Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen.32 The Privy Council observed that the joint enterprise 
case must depend rather on the wider principle whereby D is criminally liable for acts done 
by P of a type which the former foresees but does not necessarily intend.33 It is not my 
intention to examine whether Sir Robin Cooke in this case had misinterpreted the doctrine of 
joint enterprise.34 However, the objective effect of this case is that D will be made fully liable 
for the collateral crime committed in the course of their joint enterprise to do the underlying 
																																																								
31 Johns v The Queen [1980] 143 CLR 108, 131; R v Smith [1963] 1 WLR 1200, 1200.   
32 Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen [1985] AC 168. 
33 Ibid, 175.  
34 There are arguments about whether Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen took a wrong turn. See Simester, n. 11 above, 81; D. J. 
Baker, ‘Reinterpreting the Mental Element in Criminal Complicity: Change of Normative Position Theory Cannot 
Rationalize the Current Law,’ (2016) 40 Law and Psychology Review 121, 221.  
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crime as long as the collateral crime is foreseen by D and no common purpose or shared 
intention is required on the part of D with regard to the collateral crime.  This extended joint 
criminal enterprise liability is distinct from the “plain vanilla” joint enterprise in that it does 
not require common intention. This form of liability is distinct from standard complicity as 
well in that it does not require actual assistance or encouragement given to the collateral 
crime and that D’s participation in the underlying crime with a foresight of the collateral 
crime is sufficient to make him or her fully liable as a perpetrator for that crime.35 The wrong 
in standard complicity is grounded on D’s contribution to the target crime while the wrong in 
extended joint criminal enterprise lies in the mutual embarkation on the underlying crime 
being aware that the collateral crime might be committed.36  
          
English courts however take this extended joint criminal enterprise liability as an aspect of 
complicity37 asserting that by joining in the underlying crime, the participant has lent himself 
to the enterprise and by so doing has assisted or encouraged the perpetrator in the collateral 
offending. It was held that once a common purpose to commit the underlying crime is proved 
there is no need to look for further evidence of assisting or encouraging.38 However, this 
assertion is based on a legal fiction that by agreeing to do crime X the defendant, ipso facto, 
assists or encourages crime Y. 39 But this is not always the case.  Joining in an enterprise of 
robbery does not always mean D agrees that murder should be committed as well. For 
example, it is D’s first offending and D has never thought about implicating himself in the 																																																								
35 HKSAR v Chan Kam-Shing [2016] HKEC 2715 at [33]; Sze Kwan Lung v HKSAR [2004] 7 HKCFAR 475; Miller v The 
Queen [2016] HCA 30 at [4];  See Simester n.1 above, 592; Jeremy Horder’s response to (Q108), n.1 above; see also Krebs, 
n. 1 above, 592.  
36 Clayton v The Queen [2006]168 A Crim R 174, 179.  
37 R v ABCD [2011] QB 841, 854. Professor Smith also argues there is only one doctrine of complicity. Smith, n. 2 above, 
465. See also David Ormerod and Karl Laird, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 14th ed, 
2015) 238.  
38 R v Mendez [2011] QB 876, 882.  
39 Simester, n.1 above, 585-586. 
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most serious offence of murder.  Furthermore, in some cases, D has expressed his or her 
dissent in using any violence and therefore it can hardly be said that, by joining the 
underlying offence, D has actually provided assistance or encouragement to the collateral 
offending of which D strongly disapproves.  
          
It is submitted, with the support of a number of scholars,40 that extended joint criminal 
enterprise liability is distinct from standard complicity because under extended joint criminal 
enterprise liability it is not necessary to prove that P is actually assisted or encouraged by D’s 
conduct with regard to the collateral crime,41 neither is it necessary to show that D intends to 
do an act of assisting or encouraging.  It is also submitted that the defendant’s full liability for 
the collateral crime has a double constructive nature. Take the typical robbery/murder case 
for instance, a participant in an enterprise of robbery would be made fully liable for murder in 
the same way as the perpetrator of murder if he or she foresaw as a possibility that P might 
kill someone in the course of the robbery even if he or she had expressed his or her dissent to 
any killing. On the one hand, D’s participation in robbery is constructed as assisting or 
encouraging the collateral crime of murder and such constructed assistance or encouragement 
is further constructed as actus reus of murder (unlawful killing of a human being). On the 
other hand, D’s mere foresight of the commission of murder is constructed as sufficient mens 
rea for standard complicity (an intention to assist/encourage knowing or foreseeing the 
essential matters of murder) and such constructive mens rea sufficient for standard 
complicity is further constructed as sufficient mens rea for murder (an intention to kill or 
cause grievous bodily harm). A person, under extended joint criminal enterprise liability, is 
made fully liable for the collateral crime when he or she has not even assisted or encouraged 																																																								
40  AP Simester, et al., Simester and Sullivan's Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine (4th ed Hart Publishing, Oxford 2010) 
243;. See also Krebs, n. 1 above, 592; Janice Brabyn, “Secondary Party Criminal Liability in Hong Kong” (2010) 40 Hong 
Kong Law Journal 623, 625.  
41 Sullivan, n. 17 above, 209.  
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its commission, nor has he or she ever intended its commission. Such double constructive 
liability fails to reflect correctly the harm-doing and personal culpability of the individual 
who merely risks the collateral crime by joining in the underlying crime.  
Attempts Made to Justify Extended Joint Criminal Enterprise 
Doctrine 
 
Extended joint criminal enterprise liability is an extension to standard complicity making a 
participant fully liable as a perpetrator for the collateral crime which falls outside their 
common purpose, and therefore it need be justified. We have seen several attempts made 
tying to justify extended joint criminal enterprise liability as a mechanism to make a 
participant fully liable for the collateral crime, namely the change of normative position 
theory,42 the association theory43and pragmatic and policy reasons. 44 However, none of them 
gives convincing justification for extended joint criminal enterprise liability.  
          
The change of normative position theory is normally invoked to justify a strict liability 
element in a crime. Professor Gardner is the most erudite scholar to be seduced by the change 
of normative position theory. Gardner states that by committing assault a person changes his 
normative position and therefore certain adverse consequences and circumstances, which 
would not count against him but for his original assault, now count against him 
																																																								
42 Andrew Ashworth, "A Change of Normative Position: Determining the Contours of Culpability in Criminal Law" (2008) 
11(2) New Criminal Law Review 232; Youngjae Lee, "Recidivism As Omission: A Relational Account" (2009) 87(3) Texas 
Law Review 571.   
43 Virgo, n. 17 above, 856. 
44Clayton v The Queen [2006] 168 A Crim R 174, 206 at [79]; Powell and English [1999] 1 AC 1, 12.   
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automatically.45 Arguments for dispensing with a strict proportionality principle are premised 
on the view that a culpable wrongdoer may have forfeited an entitlement to punishment that 
is proportionate to his or her past harm-doing and personal culpability,46 because he or she 
has changed his or her “normative position”.47 Professor Horder argues: “The fact that I 
deliberately wrong V arguably changes my normative position vis a vis the risk of adverse 
consequences of that wrongdoing to V, whether or not foreseen or reasonably foreseeable.” 48 
In the context of extended joint criminal enterprise liability, professor Simester has argued: 49 
 
Through entering into a joint enterprise, S changes her normative position. She becomes, by her 
deliberate choice, a participant in a group action to commit a crime. Moreover, her new status has 
moral significance: she associates herself with the conduct of the other members of the group in a 
way that the mere aider or abettor, who remains an independent character throughout the episode, 
does not.  
 
Professors Horder and Hughes also adopt Professor Simester’s justification for extended joint 
criminal enterprise liability. 50 Change of normative position theory has strong opponents. 
The leading opponents are Professors Ashworth,51 Baker52 and Mitchell.53 Plausible though it 
looks, the change of normative position theory stays far from being a satisfactory one in 																																																								
45 See John Gardner, “Rationality and the Rule of the Law in Offences against the Person” (1994) 53 Cambridge Law 
Journal 502, 509.   
46 Compare Enmund v Florida [1982] 458 US 782, 800; Mullaney v Wilbur [1975] 421 US 684, 698. 
47 See K. W. Simons, "Is Strict Criminal Liability in the Grading of Offences Consistent with Retributive Desert?" (2012) 
32(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 445; William Wilson, "Murder and the Structure of Homicide" in Andrew Ashworth 
and Barry Mitchell (eds), Rethinking English Homicide Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 40.  
48 Jeremy Horder, "A Critique of the Correspondence Principle in Criminal Law" (1995)  Crim. L.R . 759, 764.  
49 Simester, n. 1 above, 598-599.  
50 Jeremy Horder and David Hughes, "Joint Criminal Ventures and Murder: The prospect for Law Reform" (2009) 20(3) 
King's Law Journal 379, 398.  
51 Andrew Ashworth, Positive Obligations in Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013) 130-147. 
52 Baker, n. 19 above, 82. 
53 Barry Mitchell, "Minding the Gap in Unlawful and Dangerous Act Manslaughter: A Moral Defence for One-punch 
Killers" (2008) 72(6) Journal of Criminal Law 537, 541-542.  
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justifying a person’s liability for the unintended consequences resulting from his commission 
of a crime. In the first place, it is implicit what kind of normative position it is to be changed 
by committing a crime. It is true that criminal law sets out an abstract general rule that we 
should not infringe others’ interests by committing crimes;54 so when each individual in our 
society acts lawfully, peace and mutual respect are guaranteed. In this sense, it could be said 
that a person’s normative position as an innocent individual who is protected from criminal 
prosecution has been changed. However, criminal law, especially contemporary criminal law, 
is not just a simple system in deciding what is lawful and what is unlawful; it is much more 
than that. Criminal law takes culpability and harm as the basis for imposing criminal 
liability55 and has developed a sophisticated and interactive system to categorise different 
types of wrongs into different crimes. The normative position of an offender varies due to the 
crimes he has committed. The ambiguous and implicit explanation of what the exact 
normative position is cannot answer why a person by committing one kind of criminal 
wrongdoing should be responsible for a specific harmful unintended consequence ensued. 
We need a much clearer interpretation of what the normative position is.  
 
In the second place, we are told that by committing a common assault on V, D had changed 
his normative position vis-à-vis V in such a way as to render D liable for greater harm than D 
foresaw when he was committing the assault, but we are not told why this should be so.56 
Professor Ashworth observes that most defenders of change of normative position theory 
state it is “intentionality” that changes a person’s normative position.57 However, based on 
the notion of intentionality it encounters problems in applying to impulsive conduct or acts 
																																																								
54 See Ashworth, n. 42 above, 242.  
55 See generally Andrew von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) 81.  
56 Ashworth, n. 42 above, 245; Horder, n. 48 above, 764. 
57 Ibid, Ashworth, 243.  
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done in temper.58 Moreover, an intention to commit a specific crime does not indicate an 
intention to bring any harm of any description. Supporters have provided some restrictive 
principles to prevent it from making a person liable for consequences, which have too great a 
moral distance from what has been anticipated. It is asserted that entering the same family of 
offenses, as by committing a common assault, is said to be sufficiently morally significant to 
justify holding D liable for some more serious offenses against the person.59 However, we are 
still unclear about why the intentional or knowing commission of a crime of the same family 
should render a person criminally liable for the unforeseen consequences of the conduct, 
which might otherwise be described as accidental.  As Professor Simons points out, “it is 
empirically absurd and normatively unacceptable to interpret every decision to commit a 
serious crime as an intentional waiver of the right to proportional treatment.”60 It would be 
unjustifiable to say the defendant has forfeited all his or she rights to fair labelling and 
proportionate punishment to any consequences that follow from his or her conduct just 
because his or her very first conduct is a crime. No good reasons have been given for why 
and how the normative position is changed, other than the assertion that there has been a 
change of normative position, and that begs the question.61 
 
The change of normative position theory encounters more problems in the context of 
extended joint criminal enterprise to justify holding D liable for P’s collateral offending. In 
perpetration liability, it is the defendant’s own act that has caused the unintended 
consequence; but in the context of extended joint criminal enterprise, quite differently, it is 																																																								
58 Ibid, 244. 
59 See John Gardner, “On the General Part of the Criminal Law”, in Antony Duff (ed), Philosophy and the Criminal Law: 
Principle and Critique (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 243-244. Mitchell, n. 55 above, 541; C. M. V. 
Clarkson, “Context and Culpability in Involuntary Manslaughter”, in Jeremy Horder (ed), Rethinking English Homicide Law 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004) 160.   
60 Simons, n. 47 above, 449.  
61 Ashworth, n. 42 above, 245.  
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the autonomous and independent perpetrator’s deliberate voluntary action that has caused the 
prohibited harm in the collateral crime.  There is a big moral difference between a person 
taking the consequences of his or her own personal acts and taking the consequences of the 
autonomous and independent conduct of another.62  It might be plausible to say that the 
defendant has changed his or her normative position with regard to the protected interest in 
the underlying crime he or she assisted/encouraged, but it is unjustifiable to say that such a 
defendant has changed his or her normative position in relation to any protected interest in 
any possible incidental crime which is not even the product of his or her own conduct. The 
change of normative position theory cannot justify making a participant in a joint criminal 
enterprise fully liable as a perpetrator for the collateral crime because it fails to notice the 
double constructive nature of extended joint criminal enterprise liability. Actually, the 
theory’s initiator Professor Gardner has not only abandoned his original assertions, but has 
repudiated any suggestion that his aim was to present a positive justification for any 
constructive liability.63 
 
Professor Virgo puts forward an association theory to justify extended joint criminal 
enterprise liability.  He holds that a person should be liable for the commission of the 
substantive offence by another where he can be considered to be associated with it,64 and that 
complicity liability can be based on foresight and association.65 According to Virgo, actus 
reus of complicity can be based on association only; and D, who participates in an underlying 
crime with the foresight that a collateral crime might be committed, can be deemed to have 
																																																								
62 Baker, n. 19 above, 82. 
63 John Gardner, Offences and Defences (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007) 246-247.	
64 See Virgo, n. 17 above, 860.  
65 Ibid, 862.  
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associated himself with the collateral crime.66 Therefore, extended joint criminal enterprise is 
one aspect of complicity, not a distinct principle.  
 
It is submitted that this association theory is indefensible in justifying extended joint criminal 
enterprise liability. To begin with, the argument that mere association is one form of the 
conduct element of complicity is never admitted by case law. Standard complicity liability 
requires actual assistance/encouragement though it does not matter whether the 
assistance/encouragement makes a difference to the commission of the target crime.67  
Professor Virgo defends his assertion that association is sufficient actus reus for derivative 
complicity by considering the prize fight case. He states: 68 
 
Spectators at a prize fight can be considered to be accessories not simply because of their 
voluntary presence, but where their presence was not accidental, because they could be considered 
to have acted in concert with those who were fighting, so that they are associated with it, even 
though it cannot be proved that the fighters were actually encouraged by their presence and the 
fight would have occurred without their presence. 
 
If there is an agreement that spectators will be present at the prize fight, it is not problematic 
to argue that the spectators have encouraged the fight by their presence. However, if there is 
no such agreement or common purpose between spectators and the fighters it is implausible 
to take people who are merely present at the scene as encouragers. It was held in R v Coney69 
that mere voluntary presence at an illegal prize fight, without any positive action, was only 
																																																								
66 Ibid.    
67 R v Coney (1882) 8 QBD 534; National Coal Board v Gamble [1959] 1 QB 11; R v Clarkson [1971] 1 WLR 1402; R v 
Giannetto [1997] 1 Cr App R 1; S.8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 (UK), S. 89 of the Criminal Procedure 
Ordinance Chap 221 (HK); Clayton v The Queen [2006] 168 A Crim R 174 at [20].  
68 Virgo, n. 17 above, 861. 
69 R v Coney (1882) 8 QBD 534. 
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prima facie and not conclusive evidence of abetting the substantive crime. However, 
according to Virgo,70 knowing presence at a prize fight would be enough to hold a spectator 
at a prize fight, with nothing more, liable as an accessory. The court did mention the term 
“association” in R v ABCD71 but the judgment should be read as a whole and in line with 
other leading cases as well. It was held by English courts that where D joined a criminal 
enterprise to do the underlying crime, his continuous participation in the enterprise, after 
foreseeing a collateral crime might be committed, would be regarded as assisting or 
encouraging the collateral crime.72 R v ABCD73 used association to support the argument that 
by associating himself or herself with the enterprise of doing the underlying crime, D was 
giving assistance/encouragement to the collateral crime rather than to use mere association as 
an independent sufficient actus reus for complicity. Therefore, the premise of professor 
Virgo’s association theory, that association is sufficient actus reus for derivative complicity, 
seems to be wrong; and any arguments based on this premise are questionable.  
 
Based on that premise, Professor Virgo argues that collateral joint enterprise liability is one 
aspect of derivative complicity liability, and that D’s participating in the underlying crime 
with a foresight of the collateral crime is enough to make D fully liable as an accessory for 
the collateral crime as D is sufficiently associated with the collateral crime. Association with 
foresight could be used to infer tacit agreement or conditional intention to assist/encourage 
the target crime, but association itself is not sufficient as amounting to 
assisting/encouraging.74 There are plenty of cases where a person could associate himself 
																																																								
70 Virgo, n. 17 above, at 861. 
71 R v ABCD [2011] QB 841.  
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with another person’s crime without assisting or encouraging. A person may harbour secret 
thoughts and associate himself with another’s murder as he would like to see the victim get 
killed as well, but secret thoughts are not physical acts of encouragement or assistance. 
Moreover, the assertion that D’s joining in the underlying crime with the foresight that a 
collateral crime might be committed sufficiently associates him with the collateral crime,75 is 
misleading. D may have agreed with P to commit a burglary, but that does not mean 
conclusively that D has associated himself with murder which is collateral to the burglary. 
D’s foresight that murder might be committed can only be used as evidence to infer whether 
D has tacitly agreed or conditionally agreed that murder should be committed.76 Association 
theory does not tell us why mere association can equal the perpetration of the collateral crime 
and why mere foresight that another person might commit the collateral crime can equal the 
requisite mens rea of the collateral crime.   
 
Neither the change of normative position theory nor the association theory can justify 
extended joint criminal enterprise liability. However, courts have taken pragmatic and policy 
reasons to support extended joint criminal enterprise liability.77 In the leading English case of 
R v Powell and English,78 three main pragmatic and policy considerations were listed to 
justify extended joint criminal enterprise liability.  Firstly, it was asserted that extended joint 
criminal enterprise liability is necessary for crime control because “experience has shown 
that joint enterprises only too readily escalate into the commission of greater offences”.79 
Secondly, it was contended that the doctrine of extended joint criminal enterprise relates to 
																																																								
75 Virgo, n. 17 above, 862.   
76 Baker, n. 19 above, 19. 
77 R v Powell and English [1999] 1 AC 1, 14; Clayton v The Queen [2006] 168 A Crim R 174, 206; HKSAR v Chan Kam-
Shing [2016] HKEC 2715 at [30]; Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30 at [36].  
78 R v Powell and English [1999] 1 AC 1.  
79 Ibid, 14.  
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“the need to give effective protection to the public against criminals operating in gangs”.80 
Thirdly, it was argued that “in the real world proof of an intention sufficient for murder 
would be well nigh impossible in the vast majority of joint enterprise cases.”81 Such 
pragmatic and policy considerations have received support from scholars as well. Professors 
Simester and Sullivan argue that, “a group constituted by a joint unlawful enterprise is a form 
of society that has set itself against the law and order of society at large”,82 which imports 
additional and special reasons why the law must intervene. However these considerations are 
not convincing justifications.  
 
With regard to the first and second assertions that extended joint criminal enterprise liability 
serves the purpose of crime control and deterrence, I will show that the deterrence function is 
not as effective as English courts have alleged. Criminal law does dislike joint criminal 
enterprises because of their dangerousness to society; and therefore criminal law needs to 
take effective actions against joint criminal enterprises, especially gang activities. However, 
this does not mean that the only way we can deal with them is to apply double constructive 
liability that manifested in the extended joint criminal enterprise doctrine. A participant in a 
joint criminal enterprise to do a less serious underlying crime only would not be deterred 
from killing, since he has not killed;83 nor would such a person get his just desert for killing 
should he be sentenced to life imprisonment. Professor Dressler argues that “accomplice 
liability rules may be unjust, and not incidentally, counter-utilitarian, because—unlike all 
other aspects of criminal responsibility—they are not tied to the doctrine of [direct] 
																																																								
80 Ibid, 25; the deterrence aim of keeping extended joint criminal enterprise liability is also expressed in House of Commons, 
Joint Enterprise report n. 1 above, 14. 
81 R v Powell and English [1999] 1 AC 1, 14.  
82 See Simester et al, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 4th ed, 2010) 244. 
83 See Paul H. Robinson, Distributive Principles of Criminal Law: Who Should be Punished How Much (New York: Oxford 
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causation.” 84  Posner 85  and Shavell 86  have argued that without any deterrent benefit, 
punishment is pointless.  Punishing a participant in a joint enterprise for any collateral crime 
he foresaw as a possibility may serve the purpose of general deterrence for it gives the 
general public a signal that joining a joint criminal enterprise is something they should avoid. 
But it remains problematic to achieve such abstract general deterrence at the cost of justice 
and fairness by adopting a doctrine, which is incompatible with basic contemporary criminal 
law principles such as fair labelling and proportionate punishment.  A fair and just criminal 
justice system can achieve the deterrence goals with the use of fair labelling and 
proportionate punishment.87 No extra benefit is gained from having unfair crime labels and 
disproportionate punishments based on double constructive liability which collateral joint 
enterprise liability allows for. Unjust punishments lead to disutility as far as deterrence is 
concerned.88 
 
Furthermore, it seems that punishing a participant using such double constructive liability 
could not achieve the goals of specific deterrence either. It is the perpetrator’s autonomous 
and independent choice to commit the collateral crime, over which a participant in the joint 
enterprise has no control; therefore the cost-benefit evaluation may not work in the mind of 
the participant over an act which he has no control. There are many costs and benefits for 
those choosing to participate in a joint criminal enterprise foreseeing certain potential 
collateral crimes might be perpetrated by one of the participants in executing the underlying 
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crime, but it is difficult to imagine any simple calculation as justifying equal liability for 
those participants and the perpetrators with regard to the collateral crimes. Special deterrence 
can only work well when those it aims to deter know the law or have a chance of guessing 
what the law might be.89 However, publicly available information about collateral joint 
enterprise liability is patchy and ad hoc90 and many who are convicted through collateral 
joint enterprise perceive the law only after being convicted. And those who are convicted 
through extended joint criminal enterprise liability, especially for murder, often refuse to 
accept that the label and sentence they have received justly reflect their wrongdoing.91 
Consequently, the deterrence effect of unfair punishment seems not as effective as the 
English courts hold.  
 
With regard to the third pragmatic consideration that extended joint criminal enterprise 
liability will alleviate the prosecution from unrealisable burden of proof,92 it is submitted that 
principles of justice should not be abandoned in order to get easy convictions. The extended 
joint criminal enterprise liability has the advantage that if the Crown cannot prove which 
gang member perpetrated the collateral crime it can convict them all, if it can prove it had to 
be one of them,93 and that the Crown need not prove intention on D’s part but mere 
recklessness would be enough.94 When the state finds it difficult to prove criminal charges 
using personal liability offences it may find it easier to use mechanisms that deem all present 
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equally liable, but this sort of collective liability is unjust. It is also counter-utilitarian.95 
Extended joint criminal enterprise liability has caused serious difficulties for juries due to its 
complexity and lack of clarity.96 It is reported that collateral joint enterprise liability has been 
the subject of a high number of appeals in recent years.97 Most of the difficulties have to do 
with the complexity of the rules, not with proving the facts or proving who did it. There are 
many cases where it is difficult for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the 
required mental elements of a crime, but this does not mean the fault element should be 
supplanted with one that is easier to prove—or with strict collective liability for the entire 
group. There is nothing to be gained by obtaining easy convictions at the cost of 
circumventing the core principles of justice. Failures of justice due to difficulties of proof in 
multi-party cases should be addressed directly, rather than by creating fictitious rule. 
The Extreme Unfairness and Injustice of Double Constructive 
Liability Manifested in Extended Joint Criminal Enterprise Doctrine 
  
It has been argued above that the doctrine of extended joint criminal enterprise manifests a 
form of double constructive liability, which cannot be justified normatively. Now the extreme 
unfairness and injustice of such a double constructive liability will be expounded.   
 
Stand complicity is a form of constructive liability in that an accessory’s full liability for the 
target crime is constructed on his or her participation in the commission of that crime. His or 
her assisting/encouraging the commission of the target crime is constructed as perpetration of 
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that crime, and his or her mens rea in assisting or encouraging its commission is constructed 
as requisite mens rea of that crime. However, assisting/encouraging is normatively different 
from perpetration; the latter causes the prohibited harm in the target crime but the former 
merely contributes to the occurrence of that prohibited harm in a remote way. The causation 
requirement in criminal liability links the perpetrator’s guilt and punishment to the prohibited 
harm and serves as an essential tool for measuring the perpetrator’s moral desert and 
determining what will be proportionate punishment for the harm caused.98 “Natural events 
occur in consequence of some antecedent events” and are governed by the laws of nature.99 It 
is the logic of causal laws that given certain conditions it can be said with certainty that 
certain result will occur or not. But human actions are wild cards and the law of nature 
governs natural events cannot be applied to human beings. Humans act as they choose unless 
they are coerced, deceived or fettered so that they cannot freely choose to do what they 
desire. Complicity makes a person liable for the crime another independent and autonomous 
individual has committed, the normal causation rules in perpetration liability do not apply in 
this context.100  
 
Complicity does not require but-for cause, a possibility of but-for relationship would 
suffice. 101  Even if in some cases it can be argued that but for the accessory’s 
assisting/encouraging the prohibited harm in the target crime would not have occurred as and 
when it did, the legal cause test can never be met. The perpetrator’s free, deliberate and 
voluntary perpetration has broken any chain of causation between the accessory’s conduct 																																																								
98 See Joshua Dressler, "Reforming Complicity Law: Trivial Assistance as a Lesser Offence?" (2008) 5(2) Ohio State 
Journal of Criminal Law 427, 436;  Sanford H. Kadish, "Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of 
Doctrine" (1985) 73(2) California Law Review 323, 330.  
99 Ibid, Kadish.  
100 When I refer to causation I have in mind the double-prong test used in perpetration liability, that is, the but-for cause and 
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and the prohibited harm in the target crime. The thumb rule of novus actus interveniens 
provides that where a person knowingly intervenes and therefore brings about the prohibited 
harm, without being fettered, constrained or deceived by another, his intervening act will 
absolve the previous actor of criminal liability.102 Where the so called perpetrator is not 
making a free, deliberate and voluntary choice to do the crime, the innocent agency doctrine 
will apply and the person who deceives, coerces or compels will be liable for the crime as 
real perpetrator. Some scholars argue that accessories can cause through the conduct of the 
perpetrator,103 but they are using the word “causation” “in a special or technical sense that 
need not conform to our ordinary use of the word, while still trading on what we normally 
mean by it.”104 Actually, it is just because causation does not work for assisting/encouraging 
that complicity came into being working as soft clay around the contours of perpetration 
liability.105 Complicity is marked out from paradigm perpetration liability in that the basis of 
complicity is not what the defendant has done but what the perpetrator has done. 106 
Therefore, assisting/encouraging is normatively different from perpetration.  
 
Furthermore, assisting/encouraging is less harmful and less dangerous than perpetration in 
that the harmfulness of assistance/encouragement is contingent on the perpetrator’s making 
an independent and autonomous choice to commit the target crime. Assisters/encouragers 
stand one step further from the prohibited harm because the harm is initiated by the 
perpetrator. Therefore, participation is a remote harm, as compared to perpetration, which the 																																																								
102 R v Kennedy (No.2) [2008] 1 AC 269, 276; R v Gnango [2012] 1 AC 827, 867; Burns v R [2011] NWSCCA 56;  H. L. A. 
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"Finis for Novus Actus?" (1989) 48 Cambridge Law Journal 391, 398.  
103 See generally Sullivan, n. 17 above; John Gardner, "Complicity and Causality" (2007) 1 Criminal Law and Philosophy 
127, 141; Michael S. Moore, Causation and Responsibility (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) 232. 
104 Daniel Yeager, "Helping, Doing, and the Grammar of Complicity" (1996) 15(1) Criminal Justice Ethics 25, 29.  
105 Moore, n. 103 above, 232.  
106 William Wilson, Central Issues in Criminal Theory (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002) 195.  
	 24 
criminal law seeks to prevent. When we are speaking of remote harm, it is not the literal 
spatio-temporal remoteness that matters; rather, it is the remoteness in a sense that such harm 
involves certain kinds of contingencies that matters.107 The harmfulness of perpetration is 
certain because it initiates the prohibited harm; the harmfulness of participation is not certain 
in itself as it is contingent on the perpetrator’s independent choice.  It is in this sense that 
assisting or encouraging is less harmful than perpetration. Moreover, assisting/encouraging is 
less dangerous than perpetration because accessories do not have control over the occurrence 
of the prohibited harm and they do not have the fortitude or resolve to commit the crime by 
their own hands. As moral agents, we have the capacity to choose to violate the law or not.108 
The perpetrator is made fully liable because he or she has unjustifiably caused certain change 
in certain circumstances in this world while he or she has full control over the direct action 
that produces the harm. But assisters/encouragers not only have no control over the eventual 
prohibited harm, but also have no control over the conduct which causes the eventual harm. 
They leave it all to the decision of the perpetrator.  Assisters/encouragers may never commit 
the crime if they are going to use their own hands to do the dirty work. An intention to 
assist/encourage the commission of the target crime is different from the mens rea of that 
crime. It is easier to imagine killing someone than actually doing it. Did Shakespeare’s Lady 
Macbeth have the same mental wherewithal as Macbeth? She certainly had the wherewithal 
to encourage, but perhaps not to perpetrate. There is a difference in the mental psychology 
and hence dangerousness of a remote party to a direct act of killing. It takes more nerve to 
perpetrate than to assist or encourage from one step removed. Treating an accessory the same 
as a perpetrator is a form of constructive liability because he or she has neither actus reus nor 
mens rea of the target crime.  																																																								
107 See Andrew von Hirsch, "Extending the Harm Principle: 'Remote' Harms and Fair Imputation" in A. P. Simester and A. 
T. H. Smith (eds), Harm and Culpability (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) 263.  
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In the context of extended joint criminal enterprise liability there is a double layer of 
constructive liability. D’s participation in the underlying crime is constructed as actual 
assistance/encouragement in the collateral crime, and D’s foresight of the commission of the 
collateral crime is constructed as sufficient mens rea for complicity, which requires an 
intention to assist/encourage knowing all the essential matters of the target crime.109 Such 
fictitiously constructed actus reus and mens rea for standard complicity regarding the 
collateral crime is further constructed as the requisite actus reus and mens rea of the 
collateral crime. Assisting/encouraging the collateral crime is less harmful than perpetration 
the collateral crime, and risking the collateral crime is less harmful than assisting or 
encouraging the collateral crime; therefore, risking the collateral crime in a joint criminal 
enterprise is much less harmful than perpetration the collateral crime. Labelling and 
punishing assistance/encouragement and perpetration in the same way is unfair and unjust as 
it has infringed the principle of fair labelling 110  and the principle of proportionate 
punishment.111 Extended joint criminal enterprise liability adds even more unfairness and 
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injustice by allowing a person to be labelled and punished for a much worse wrongdoing 
when he or she never perpetrated that wrongdoing, nor did he or she ever assist/encourage 
that wrongdoing.  
 
Retributive justice requires fair labelling and proportionate punishment in criminal law.  Fair 
labelling is a principle of justice immune from challenge112 though it is not explicitly adopted 
in some jurisdictions. The principle of fair labelling is widely deployed in many areas of 
criminal law,113 such as distinguishing different kinds of homicide114distinguishing theft from 
obtaining property by deception115and distinguishing rape from other sexual offences.116 It is 
essential to the communication function of criminal law that crime labels should 
communicate different degrees of condemnation of different types of conduct, and that crime 
labels should be created to reflect the degree of harm-doing and personal culpability.117 Only 
when the crime label fairly represents harm-doing and personal culpability would it 
communicate to the public, legal professionals as well as the defendant effectively and 
therefore reinforce legal compliance. Proportionate punishment is in the core of retributive 
justice118 requiring the severity of punishment should be proportionate to the seriousness of 
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the criminal conduct of which the defendant is convicted.119 Punishing the offender for his or 
her conduct indicates community’s disapproval and reprobation towards that conduct. It is 
just because punishment visits blame that it should be proportionate with the offender’s 
blameworthiness. Disproportionate punishment is unfair and unjust because it purports to 
condemn the defendant for what he or she has done yet visit more or less censure on him or 
her than the blameworthiness his or her conduct would warrant.120 
 
According to the principle of fair labelling, not only the type of wrongdoing should be 
distinguished with different crime labels but also the degree of wrongdoing should be 
represented in the crime labels. 121  Take the typical robbery-murder case for example, a 
participant in a joint enterprise of robbery risks the collateral crime murder being perpetrated 
by his confederates by remaining in the enterprise after foreseeing the risk of murder being 
committed, but he has neither assisted/encouraged the commission of murder nor perpetrated 
the actus reus of murder. Labelling risk-taking as assisting/encouraging and then further 
labelling such fictitiously constructed assisting/encouraging as perpetration goes against the 
principle of fair labelling, because the type and gravity of the participant’s harm-doing (risk-
taking) is not correctly represented by the crime label (murder). Moreover, labelling the 
participant in robbery as a murderer does not reflect his personal culpability (mens rea) 
either. The mens rea represented by murder is an intention to kill or cause grievous bodily 
harm, but the participant merely has a foresight with regard to the perpetrator’s unlawful 
killing.  
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The principle of proportionate punishment requires the severity of punishment should be 
proportionate to the seriousness of the criminal conduct of which the defendant is 
convicted.122 Serious wrongdoing should not be punished leniently and trivial wrongdoing 
should not be punished severely. The punishment given to a participator in an extended joint 
criminal enterprise case does not match the defendant’s harm-doing which is mere risk-taking 
rather than perpetration. Take the robbery-murder case for instance again, taking a risk that P 
might kill is much less harmful than the conduct of killing and the D’s foresight that P might 
commit murder is less culpable than an intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm by his 
own hands.  Punishing D’s risk-taking with punishment designed for unlawful killing with 
the intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm is extremely disproportionate. If people are to 
be held equally liable, there should be correspondence in their personal culpability (the 
specific mens rea they hold) and the harmfulness of their wrongdoing. Certainly, there is no 
such correspondence in the context of extended joint criminal enterprise liability.  
 
Punishing assister/encourager the same as perpetrator has ignored the normative difference 
between assisting/encouraging and perpetration and therefore is unjust and unfair. Such 
unfairness and injustice is doubled in the context of extended joint criminal enterprise 
liability when the defendant is constructively made liable for the collateral crime on the legal 
fiction that by joining in the underlying crime he or she has also given 
assistance/encouragement to the collateral crime had he or she foreseen the collateral crime 
as incidental. It is the severe infringement of principles of fair labelling and proportionate 
punishment that we have to abrogate this double constructive liability. If any criminalisation 
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is needed to deal with such defendants, it should be done in a way to correctly reflect the 
defendants’ harm-doing and personal culpability.  
Proposing a New Lesser Offence of Risking Another’s Collateral 
Offending 
 
It has been argued above that extended joint enterprise liability should be abolished, but what 
options do we have if that abolition is done? English law has inchoate assisting/encouraging 
offences enacted in Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007. Would such offences be possible 
solutions to deal with cases covered by the current extended joint criminal enterprise 
liability? The answer is negative. Though these inchoate offences punish offenders based on 
individual liability rather than derivative liability under complicity, they do require the 
defendant has done a conduct that is capable of assisting/encouraging the commission of the 
target crime.123 But in an extended joint criminal enterprise case, the defendant did not do 
anything that was capable of assisting/encouraging the perpetrator to commit the collateral 
offence. What he or she did was participating with the perpetrator in the underlying crime, 
but this did not necessarily encourage the perpetrator to commit any crime that was foreseen 
as a possible incident of the joint enterprise to do the underlying crime. Moreover, the 
defendant’s foresight of the collateral crime cannot satisfy the mens rea requirements of any 
of the inchoate assisting/encouraging offences in the 2007 Act, which require either an 
intention or oblique intention to assist/encourage the perpetrator’s crime.124  
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However, the judicial practice shows an inclination, however, to punish people who 
participated in an underlying crime with the foresight of a collateral crime being committed, 
rather than to let them go free. This is interestingly shown in the case of R v Jogee where 
their Lordships provided manslaughter as an alternative to convict the defendant after having 
abolished the extended joint enterprise doctrine which would make the defendant liable for 
murder.125 But this approach is far from satisfactory. Their Lordships seem to have conflated 
constructive manslaughter and complicity by making this recommendation. If D 
assisted/encouraged P to do an unlawful act against V, say, inflicting moderate bodily harm 
short of grievous bodily harm, and P did as assisted/encouraged causing an unintended 
consequence of death, this would render P be liable for manslaughter and D be liable for 
manslaughter through derivative complicity. In such a situation there was only one crime 
committed by P, which was constructive manslaughter and it is not problematic to make D 
liable for manslaughter through derivative complicity. D’s criminal liability for manslaughter 
hinges on his assisting/encouraging P to do an unlawful act which causes death unintendedly. 
However, cases like Jogee are different in that death of the victim was caused by P’s 
deliberate and autonomous choice to commit murder. Here death was an unintended 
consequence to D, but it was the purposive, rather than unintended, consequence on P’s part. 
In such cases death was caused by the independent murderous act of the perpetrator which 
was not assisted/encouraged by D, rather than caused by the act D intended to 
assist/encourage.126 It is odd to say that D had assisted/encouraged constructive manslaughter 
while P had committed murder.127 Their Lordships had made a great contribution by 
restraining the mens rea element of complicity to intention only; however, I would say, with 
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great respect, they had not done equally well, unfortunately, with regard to the defendant’s 
liability for the perpetrator’s collateral offending.   
 
It is submitted that it is a wrong per se to risk another person’s perpetration a collateral crime 
by joining an underlying crime foreseeing that his or her confederate of the underlying crime 
might perpetrate that collateral crime. The foresight and association elements mean it is not a 
problem of moral bad luck or moral good luck.128 The participator’s liability for the collateral 
crime is not a case of moral bad luck per se, because he or she had foreseen the risk of the 
collateral crime being committed but nonetheless made a choice to join the underlying crime 
to risk the occurrence of that collateral crime. If the defendant did not join the joint 
underlying criminal enterprise such as a bank robbery or gang violence, the perpetrator might 
not have been willing to perpetrate the underlying crime on his or her own and thus the risk 
of the perpetrator perpetration a collateral crime would have been reduced. It is their joint 
enterprise that put the perpetrator in a position where he or she might commit the collateral 
offence. Such risk-taking does not warrant full criminal liability on D’s part for the collateral 
crime committed by the perpetrator, but it is enough to justify some sort of criminal liability. 
The joint enterprise of the underlying offence was the background of the collateral offending 
and D acted positively in setting this background. There is public interest in criminalise such 
culpable risk creation.129 A person who continues his or her participation in a criminal 
enterprise to do an underlying crime after having foreseen the possibility of a collateral 
crime, is taking an unjustifiable risk and thus should take criminal liability for his or her 
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culpable risk-taking. Such criminalisation could be done by having specific offence130 rather 
than through double constructive liability.   
 
Such a risk-taking rationale would encounter problems if it is used to justify labelling and 
punishing the defendant in the same way as the perpetrator for the collateral crime because 
the wrong-doing in risking another’s crime is quite different in nature and degree from 
perpetration the actus reus of that crime with the requisite mens rea. However, this rationale 
could work perfectly well for my proposed new lesser offence of risking another’s collateral 
offending because the core wrong in this new offence is the defendant’s culpable risk-taking. 
The crime label correctly reflects the defendant’s harm-doing (risk-taking) and his or her 
personal culpability (recklessness). The conduct element of this new lesser offence would be 
that D continued his or her participation in the enterprise of doing an underlying crime 
foreseeing the commission of the collateral offence as a possible incident of the joint 
enterprise. It is not his or her mere participation in the underlying crime that matters; rather, it 
is his or her continued participation after he or she had foreseen the possibility of the 
collateral offence being committed that matters. The emphasis is on his or her continual 
participation in circumstances where the risk of the collateral offence was very apparent. By 
continuing his or her participation with that foresight, D manifested sufficient culpability and 
his or her participation in these circumstances warranted some form of punishment.  
 
It is proposed that this offence is a generic offence that could be applied to any sort of crime. 
It is also proposed that this offence can only be committed if P has actually committed the 
collateral crime. The mens rea element for this new offence is subjective recklessness. As 
long as D foresaw that there was a possibility that P might commit the collateral offence it 
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would suffice. By continuing one’s participation in a criminal enterprise after having realised 
he or she was risking other collateral crimes the defendant was apparently running that risk 
unreasonably, so this means the defendant would satisfy the recklessness test when he or she 
had that foresight. Where D did not foresee that P might commit a further offence in the 
course of the underlying crime he or she should not be liable for this new offence, even if an 
ordinary person could have foreseen the commission of that further offence. The 
fundamentally different act rule will still have its place in this new offence because the 
defendant should only be responsible for what he or she subjectively risked. If the collateral 
offending by the perpetrator was fundamentally different from what the defendant had 
foreseen or contemplated, the defendant should not be liable for that offence because he or 
she did not risk it with awareness. 
Conclusion 
 
This paper seeks to provide a normative case for abolishing the doctrine of extended joint 
enterprise and replacing it with a new lesser offence of risking another’s collateral offending.  
Treating assisting/encouraging in the same way as perpetration infringes the basic criminal 
law principles of fair labelling and proportionate punishment and therefore is unfair and 
unjust. And such unfairness and injustice is doubled in the context of extended joint criminal 
enterprise where the defendant’s full liability for the collateral crime is constructed twice, out 
of his or her participation in the underlying crime. English law in the high profile case R v 
Jogee has reinterpreted the mental element for complicity liability requiring nothing short of 
intention and denied any independent extended joint enterprise doctrine. But their Lordships’ 
making the defendant liable for manslaughter for the perpetrator’s collateral offending of 
murder does not provide us a satisfactory solution. Courts in some other jurisdictions, 
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however, refuse to follow R v Jogee and retain extended joint criminal enterprise doctrine as 
valid law. It is submitted that proper law reform is needed so as to meet the requirements of 
fair labelling and proportionate punishment. A new lesser offence of risking another’s 
collateral offending, based on a risk-taking rationale, is proposed. A defendant caught by this 
new offence will not be held fully liable for a crime that he or she did not perpetrate or 
assisted/encouraged its perpetration, rather, he or she will be made liable for running an 
unreasonable risk of a collateral offending by continuing his or her participation in a criminal 
enterprise to do un underlying crime. Such criminalisation would allow the defendant to be 
labelled and punished fairly in accordance with his or her own harm-doing and personal 
culpability.    
 
